Motivation

Framework Data

Gap

Credit shock

Selection

Robustness

Conclusion

Literature

References

#### Price Selection in the Microdata

#### Peter Karadi<sup>1,4</sup> Raphael Schoenle<sup>2,4</sup> Jesse Wursten<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>European Central Bank <sup>2</sup>Brandeis University <sup>3</sup>KU Leuven <sup>4</sup>CEPR

#### September 2022

The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Cleveland Fed, the ECB or the Eurosystem

Motivation	Framework
------------	-----------

#### Data

Credit shock

Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References

# Motivation

- Rigidity of the price level influences
  - Real effects of monetary policy
  - Amplification through 'demand' channels

Gap

Motivation	Framework
------------	-----------

Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References

### Motivation

- Rigidity of the price level influences
  - Real effects of monetary policy
  - Amplification through 'demand' channels

Gap

Prices change infrequently (Bils and Klenow, 2004)

Motivation	Fram
Wotivation	Fram

#### nework Data

Gap

Credit shock

Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References

# Motivation

- Rigidity of the price level influences
  - Real effects of monetary policy
  - Amplification through 'demand' channels
- Prices change infrequently (Bils and Klenow, 2004)
- In standard price-setting models (Calvo, 1983)
  - Low frequency implies rigid price level

amework

Gap

Credit shock

Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References

# Motivation

Rigidity of the price level influences

Data

- Real effects of monetary policy
- Amplification through 'demand' channels
- Prices change infrequently (Bils and Klenow, 2004)
- In standard price-setting models (Calvo, 1983)
  - Low frequency implies rigid price level
- ▶ In models microfounded by fixed (menu) costs of adjustment (Golosov and Lucas, 2007)
  - ▶ Price level stays flexible even if a small fraction adjusts, because
  - Large price changes are selected

Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References

Selection of large price changes

Framework

Why are large price changes selected?



#### Selection of large price changes

- Why are large price changes selected?
- > Menu costs: optimal to concentrate on the products with the largest price misalignment



#### Selection of large price changes

- Why are large price changes selected?
- > Menu costs: optimal to concentrate on the products with the largest price misalignment
- When an aggregate shock hits
  - The most misaligned prices get adjusted,
  - They change by a lot, and
  - This raises the flexibility of the price level.





- ▶ Revisit the Golosov and Lucas (2007)-critique to price-rigidity
- > By measuring the strength of the selection effect using microdata



- ▶ Revisit the Golosov and Lucas (2007)-critique to price-rigidity
  - ► By measuring the strength of the selection effect using microdata
  - We measure price misalignment and identify aggregate shocks to show
    - 1. State-dependence: Probability of price adjustment increases with price misalignment unconditionally
    - 2. No selection: conditional on an aggregate shock, misalignment is immaterial
    - 3. Active gross extensive margin: Uniform shift between price increases versus price decreases



- Revisit the Golosov and Lucas (2007)-critique to price-rigidity
- ► By measuring the strength of the selection effect using microdata
- We measure price misalignment and identify aggregate shocks to show
  - 1. State-dependence: Probability of price adjustment increases with price misalignment unconditionally
  - 2. No selection: conditional on an aggregate shock, misalignment is immaterial
  - 3. Active gross extensive margin: Uniform shift between price increases versus price decreases
- Provides guidance for model choice and policy implications
  - Consistent with mildly state-dependent models with linear and flat price-adjustment hazard and sizable monetary non-neutrality



- Framework
- US supermarket data (IRi) (robust to PPI)
- Price-gap proxy: competitor's-price-gap (robust to competitors'-reset-price and reset-price gaps)
- Aggregate credit shock (robust to monetary policy shock)
- Selection
- Robustness
- Selected literature

Literature

# Conceptual framework (extending Caballero and Engel, 2007)

 Identify channels of adjustment of the price level to an aggregate shock in an environment with sticky prices

Literature

References

# Conceptual framework (extending Caballero and Engel, 2007)

- Identify channels of adjustment of the price level to an aggregate shock in an environment with sticky prices
- Caballero and Engel (2007): two channels
  - Intensive margin: larger adjustment; only channel in time-dependent
  - ► Extensive margin: new adjusters; new channel in state dependent

Literature

References

# Conceptual framework (extending Caballero and Engel, 2007)

- Identify channels of adjustment of the price level to an aggregate shock in an environment with sticky prices
- Caballero and Engel (2007): two channels
  - Intensive margin: larger adjustment; only channel in time-dependent
  - > Extensive margin: new adjusters; new channel in state dependent
- Our contribution: generalize Caballero and Engel (2007)
  - Separate extensive margin into two channels
  - Gross extensive margin: shift between price increases vs decreases
  - ► Selection: large gaps adjust with higher probability, conditional on shock


Literature

# Conceptual framework (extending Caballero and Engel, 2007)


- Identify channels of adjustment of the price level to an aggregate shock in an environment with sticky prices
- Caballero and Engel (2007): two channels
  - Intensive margin: larger adjustment; only channel in time-dependent
  - > Extensive margin: new adjusters; new channel in state dependent
- Our contribution: generalize Caballero and Engel (2007)
  - Separate extensive margin into two channels
  - Gross extensive margin: shift between price increases vs decreases
  - ► Selection: large gaps adjust with higher probability, conditional on shock
- ▶ Sufficient to concentrate on the impact effect (dynamics ~ same, Auclert et al., 2022)

### Conceptual framework (extending Caballero and Engel, 2007)

- Price adjustment frictions: lumpy price adjustment
- Price gap  $x_{it} = p_{it} p_{it}^*$ 
  - *p<sub>it</sub>* (log) price of product *i*: adjusts occasionally
  - $p_{it}^*$  (log) optimal price: influenced continuously by both product-level and aggregate factors





hazard; -x: desired change (-gap)



#### State dependence (extending Caballero and Engel, 2007)


- Concentrate on  $\pi^-$ : inflation from positive gaps ( $\pi^+$  analogous,  $\pi = \pi^- + \pi^+$ )
- Focus: shape of the adjustment hazard  $\Lambda(x)$ .
- ► Steep hazard: price changes are large unconditionally (state-dependence, not selection)





# Selection (extending Caballero and Engel, 2007)

- Selection: position of new adjusters conditional on a permanent shock m
- Gross extensive: mass of new adjusters (shift from increases to decreases)



Selection

Robustness

Conclusion

Literature

References

# Conceptual framework (Caballero and Engel, 2007)

Gap

Overview

	Time- (S,s) & Convex Lines		Linear
	dependent	hazard	hazard
Intensive margin	1	1	1
Gross extensive margin	×	1	1
Selection	×	✓	X

Empirical goal

- Measure the shape of the hazard function and gap density in the data
- Assess the strength of the margins of adjustment unconditionally
- ▶ Reassess the strength of the margins of adjustment conditional on an aggregate shock



- IRi supermarket scanner data (pprox 15% of CPI)
  - Very granular: 170 000 products
  - ▶ Wide coverage: 50 markets across the US, over 3000 stores
  - 12 years of weekly data (2001-2012)
- Suitable dataset
  - Granularity: high-quality information about close substitutes
  - Long time series: can identify aggregate fluctuations



- IRi supermarket scanner data (pprox 15% of CPI)
  - Very granular: 170 000 products
  - ▶ Wide coverage: 50 markets across the US, over 3000 stores
  - 12 years of weekly data (2001-2012)
- Suitable dataset
  - Granularity: high-quality information about close substitutes
  - Long time series: can identify aggregate fluctuations
- Baseline data 
   Data cleaning
   Expenditure weights
   Price Indexes
  - ► Reference prices: filter out temporary discounts 
    Sales filtering
  - Time-aggregation: monthly mode



- A relevant component of the gap is observable
  - Distance from the average price of close competitors,
  - Controlling for store fixed effects (regional variation, amenities)
  - Stores wants to avoid price misalignments; higher: low demand; lower: low markup



- A relevant component of the gap is observable
  - Distance from the average price of close competitors,
  - Controlling for store fixed effects (regional variation, amenities)
  - Stores wants to avoid price misalignments; higher: low demand; lower: low markup
- Competitors' reference-price gap

$$x_{pst} = p_{pst}^f - \bar{p}_{pt}^f - \hat{\alpha}_s,$$

where  $p_{pst}^{f}$  is the sales-filtered reference price and  $\hat{\alpha}_{s}$  is the store-FE in  $p_{pst}^{f} - \bar{p}_{pt}^{f} = \alpha_{s}$ .



- A relevant component of the gap is observable
  - Distance from the average price of close competitors,
  - Controlling for store fixed effects (regional variation, amenities)
  - Stores wants to avoid price misalignments; higher: low demand; lower: low markup
- Competitors' reference-price gap

$$x_{pst} = p_{pst}^f - \bar{p}_{pt}^f - \hat{\alpha}_s,$$

where  $p_{pst}^{f}$  is the sales-filtered reference price and  $\hat{\alpha}_{s}$  is the store-FE in  $p_{pst}^{f} - \bar{p}_{pt}^{f} = \alpha_{s}$ .

- Control for unobserved heterogeneity Matters
  - Deduct estimated product-store FE
  - Raise all estimates with the average product-store FE

Selection R

Robustness

Literature


Conclusion

References

# Competitors' price gap, frequency

- Adjustment hazard in the data:
  - Increases with distance from 0
  - Approximately (piecewise) linear
  - Positive at 0, mildly asymmetric
- In line with empirical literature





Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References


# Competitors' price gap, size

Size

Almost (inverse) one-on-one btw

gap and size, on average

Relevant component of the gap



Selection

Robustness


Literature Conclusion

References

# Competitors' price gap, density

Density:


- Sizable dispersion, fat tails
- Despite sales-filtering and store-FE






#### Unconditional decomposition

We use empirical hazard and density



Sufficient for decomposition (if hazard and density are representative)



#### Unconditional decomposition, cont

#### Relative contributions of channels

Intensive	Gross extensive	Selection
margin	margin	effect
73.4%	26.5%	0.2%

- Result
  - Extensive margin effective
  - Selection miniscule

Next: reassess the same, conditional on an aggregate shock



Impulse response to a credit shock

Sizable, exogenous tightening of credit conditions

#### Impulse response to a credit shock

- Sizable, exogenous tightening of credit conditions
- Identified with timing restrictions (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012)
  - Increase in the excess bond premium (default-free corporate spread)
  - No contemporaneous effect on activity, prices and interest rate




Run a series of OLS regressions h (Jordà, 2005)

$$x_{t+h} - x_t = \alpha_h + ebp_t + \Gamma_h \Psi(L) X_t + u_{t,h},$$

- ▶ x: variable of interest, e.g. (log) price level
- ebp<sub>t</sub>: credit shock
- $\Gamma_h \Psi(L) X_t$ : set of controls: contemporaneous cpi, ip, 1y and 1-12m lags of cpi, ip, 1y, ebp
- Monthly aggregates, seasonally adjusted
- ▶ 95% confidence bands



#### Credit shock, 2001-2012



Credit shock

Selection


Robustness

Literature Conclusion

References

#### Response of the supermarket-price index

Supermarket-price level



Gradual response, not unlike core CPI

Selection

Robustness


Literature

Conclusion

References

# Response of the supermarket-price index

### Supermarket-price level



- Gradual response, not unlike core CPI
- Peak effect not before 24 months



Combine the product-level proxy and the aggregate shock to assess selection.



- Combine the product-level proxy and the aggregate shock to assess selection.
- Do the new adjusters after a shock have large gaps?



- Combine the product-level proxy and the aggregate shock to assess selection.
- Do the new adjusters after a shock have large gaps?
- Approach: Selection is an interaction between
  - Aggregate shock and
  - Product-level proxy.



- Combine the product-level proxy and the aggregate shock to assess selection.
- Do the new adjusters after a shock have large gaps?
- Approach: Selection is an interaction between
  - Aggregate shock and
  - Product-level proxy.
- Framework: Linear probability model of price adjustment
  - Does the interaction term influences adjustment probability?



### Linear probability model

$$I_{pst,t+h}^{\pm} = \beta_{xih}^{\pm} x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t + \beta_{xh}^{\pm} x_{pst-1} + \beta_{ih}^{\pm} ebp_t + \gamma_h^{\pm} T_{pst-1} + \Gamma_h^{\pm} \Phi(L) X_t + \alpha_{psh}^{\pm} + \alpha_{mh}^{\pm} + \varepsilon_{psth}^{\pm},$$

- $I_{pst,t+h}^{\pm}$  indicator of price increase (resp. decrease) of product p in store s between t and t+h
- ► x<sub>pst-1</sub>: price gap (to control for its regular effect)
- ebp<sub>t</sub> is the aggregate shock (to control for its average effect)
- x<sub>pst-1</sub>ebp<sub>t</sub> gap-shock interaction (selection: focus of analysis)



## Linear probability model, cont.

$$\begin{aligned} I_{pst,t+h}^{\pm} &= \beta_{xih}^{\pm} x_{pst-1} e \hat{b} p_t + \beta_{xh}^{\pm} x_{pst-1} + \beta_{ih}^{\pm} e b p_t + \\ &\gamma_h^{\pm} T_{pst-1} + \Gamma_h^{\pm} \Phi(L) X_t + \alpha_{psh}^{\pm} + \alpha_{mh}^{\pm} + \varepsilon_{psth}^{\pm}, \end{aligned}$$

- ► *T<sub>pst</sub>* (log) age of price (to control for time dependence)
- $\Gamma_h^{\pm} \Phi(L) X_t$  aggregate controls
- $\alpha \pm_{psh}$  product-store FE (to control for unexplained cross-sectional heterogeneity)
- $\alpha_{mh}^{\pm}$  are calendar-month FE (to control for seasonality)
- Standard errors are clustered across categories and time

Selection

# Results, competitors' price gap, credit shock, h=24m

	(1) Price increase $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+}\right)$	(2) Price decrease $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{-}\right)$
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	1.55***
Shock $(ebp_t)$	-0.03***	0.03***
Selection $(x_{pst-1}\hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	0.01
Age $(T_{pst-1})$	0.02***	0.00**
Product × store FE	1	✓
Calendar-month FE	✓	$\checkmark$
Time FE	×	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>
within $R^2$	18.5%	17.3%



- State dependence: Gap raises frequency Spec.
  - Probability of price increase 26 pp. lower btw 1st and 3rd quartile (decrease 23 pp higher)



- State dependence: Gap raises frequency Spec.
  - ▶ Probability of price increase 26 pp. lower btw 1st and 3rd quartile (decrease 23 pp higher)
- Adjustment on the (gross) extensive margin: aggregate shock shifts the probability of price increases vs price decreases
  - Probability of price increase 1pp lower after a 1sd credit tightening (30 bps)
  - Probability of price decrease 1pp higher after a similar tightening



Implications, cont.

► No selection: Specification

- No evidence of significant interaction
- Conditional on the shock, not adjusting the prices with larger gap



Implications, cont.

► No selection: Specification

- No evidence of significant interaction
- Conditional on the shock, not adjusting the prices with larger gap


### Time dependence

Older prices are changed with higher probability

Motivation	Framework	Data	Gap	Credit shock	Selection	Robustness	Literature	Conclusion	References
Margi	ns of adjus	stment							


	Data	Time- (S,s) & Convex		Linear
		dependent	hazard	hazard
Intensive margin	1	1	1	1
Gross extensive margin	1	×	1	1
Selection	X	×	1	×

- Evidence consistent with linear hazard models with no selection
- Inconsistent with time-dependent (constant hazard) models (Calvo, 1983)
- ▶ Inconsistent with (S,s) and convex hazard models (Golosov and Lucas, 2007)



Competitor based gap (in %)

Competitor based gap (in %)



Competitors' reset-price gap

Competitor based gap (in %)

→ No FE

#### Robustness to non-linearity, alternative gap, shock, data

Competitor based gap (in %)



> Selection is a robust prediction of menu cost models with steep (step) hazard functions



- ▶ Selection is a robust prediction of menu cost models with steep (step) hazard functions
- Classic papers (Caplin and Spulber, 1987; Golosov and Lucas, 2007)



- Selection is a robust prediction of menu cost models with steep (step) hazard functions
- Classic papers (Caplin and Spulber, 1987; Golosov and Lucas, 2007)
- More recent iterations:
  - ► Karadi and Reiff (2019): even if idiosyncratic shocks have fat tails (Midrigan, 2011)
  - Bonomo et al. (2020): even with multiproduct firms (Alvarez and Lippi, 2014)



- Selection is a robust prediction of menu cost models with steep (step) hazard functions
- Classic papers (Caplin and Spulber, 1987; Golosov and Lucas, 2007)
- More recent iterations:
  - ▶ Karadi and Reiff (2019): even if idiosyncratic shocks have fat tails (Midrigan, 2011)
  - ▶ Bonomo et al. (2020): even with multiproduct firms (Alvarez and Lippi, 2014)
- Selection weakens with flatter hazard function caused by information frictions (Woodford, 2009; Costain and Nakov, 2011), or 'random menu costs' (Dotsey et al., 1999; Luo and Villar, 2021; Alvarez et al., 2022)



- Selection is a robust prediction of menu cost models with steep (step) hazard functions
- Classic papers (Caplin and Spulber, 1987; Golosov and Lucas, 2007)
- More recent iterations:
  - ► Karadi and Reiff (2019): even if idiosyncratic shocks have fat tails (Midrigan, 2011)
  - ▶ Bonomo et al. (2020): even with multiproduct firms (Alvarez and Lippi, 2014)
- Selection weakens with flatter hazard function caused by information frictions (Woodford, 2009; Costain and Nakov, 2011), or 'random menu costs' (Dotsey et al., 1999; Luo and Villar, 2021; Alvarez et al., 2022)
- Us: Empirical question



- Implicit hazard-function (Caballero and Engel, 2007; Alvarez et al., 2022)
  - Estimate density and hazard function by matching moments
  - ▶ Quadratic hazard function (result in Alvarez et al., 2022)
  - ▶ Sizable selection (Berger and Vavra, 2018; Petrella, Santoro and Simonsen, 2019)
  - ▶ Weak selection (Luo and Villar, 2021; Alvarez et al., 2022)



- Implicit hazard-function (Caballero and Engel, 2007; Alvarez et al., 2022)
  - Estimate density and hazard function by matching moments
  - Quadratic hazard function (result in Alvarez et al., 2022)
  - ▶ Sizable selection (Berger and Vavra, 2018; Petrella, Santoro and Simonsen, 2019)
  - ▶ Weak selection (Luo and Villar, 2021; Alvarez et al., 2022)
- Explicit hazard function
  - Relative to competitors' prices (Campbell and Eden, 2014; Gagnon, López-Salido and Vincent, 2012): ~linear, flat, no selection
  - Relative to wholesale prices/cost (Eichenbaum et al., 2011; Gautier et al., 2022): ~linear, steeper, no selection
  - ► Us: competitors' prices, multiple retailers, control for heterogeneity



## Selected literature, cont.

- Construct informative moments that reveals selection
  - ► Carvalho and Kryvtsov (2021): preset-price-relative vs. inflation
  - ▶ Dedola et al. (2019): selection bias in Danish PPI
  - Us: shock-gap interaction on frequency



► Use granular supermarket and PPI data to measure selection



Use granular supermarket and PPI data to measure selection

We have found that

- 1. State dependence: Adjustment probability increases linearly with gap
- 2. No selection: Conditional on shock adjustment independent of price gap
- 3. Gross extensive margin: key adjustment channel



Use granular supermarket and PPI data to measure selection

We have found that

- 1. State dependence: Adjustment probability increases linearly with gap
- 2. No selection: Conditional on shock adjustment independent of price gap
- 3. Gross extensive margin: key adjustment channel

Consistent with linear-hazard state-dependent models

## Conclusion, cont.

Implications

- Evidence inconsistent with standard time-dependent (Calvo, 1983) or state-dependent (Golosov and Lucas, 2007) models
- Shift between increases versus decreases determines the extensive-margin effect Data
- Slope of the hazard function is informative about the strength of this shift
- Flat hazard implies sizable monetary non-neutrality



- Alvarez, Fernando and Francesco Lippi (2014) "Price Setting with Menu Cost for Multiproduct Firms," *Econometrica*, Vol. 82, pp. 89–135.
- Alvarez, Fernando, Francesco Lippi, and Aleksei Oskolkov (2022) "The Macroeconomics of Sticky Prices with Generalized Hazard Functions," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 137, pp. 989–1038.
- Anderson, Eric, Benjamin A. Malin, Emi Nakamura, Duncan Simester, and Jon Steinsson (2017) "Informational Rigidities and the Stickiness of Temporary Sales," *Journal of Monetary Economics*, Vol. 90, pp. 64–83.

Gap

References

References II

Auclert, Adrien, Rodolfo D Rigato, Matthew Rognlie, and Ludwig Straub (2022) "New

Pricing Models, Same Old Phillips Curves?" Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.

Berger, David and Joseph Vavra (2018) "Dynamics of the US Price Distribution," *European Economic Review*, Vol. 103, pp. 60–82.

Bils, Mark and Peter J. Klenow (2004) "Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky Prices," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 112, pp. 947–985.

Bonomo, Marco, Carlos Carvalho, Oleksiy Kryvtsov, Sigal Ribon, and Rodolfo Rigato (2020) "Multi-Product Pricing: Theory and Evidence from Large Retailers in Israel," Staff Working Papers 20-12, Bank of Canada.

Selection

Robustness

References III

Caballero, Ricardo J and Eduardo MRA Engel (2007) "Price Stickiness in Ss models: New Interpretations of Old Results," *Journal of Monetary Economics*, Vol. 54, pp. 100–121.

Calvo, Guillermo A. (1983) "Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework," *Journal of Monetary Economics*, Vol. 12, pp. 383 – 398.

Campbell, Jeffrey R. and Benjamin Eden (2014) "RIGID PRICES: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. SCANNER DATA," *International Economic Review*, Vol. 55, pp. 423–442.

Caplin, Andrew S. and Daniel F. Spulber (1987) "Menu Costs and the Neutrality of Money,"

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, pp. 703–726.

Carvalho, Carlos and Oleksiy Kryvtsov (2021) "Price selection," *Journal of Monetary Economics*, Vol. 122, pp. 56–75. Gap

References

References IV

Costain, James and Anton Nakov (2011) "Distributional Dynamics under Smoothly

State-Dependent Pricing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 646 – 665.

- Dedola, L, M Strom Krisoffersen, and G Zullig (2019) "Price Synchronization and Cost Passthrough in Multiproduct Firms: Evidence from Danish Producer Prices," Technical report, Mimeo.
- Dotsey, Michael, Robert G. King, and Alexander L. Wolman (1999) "State-Dependent Pricing and the General Equilibrium Dynamics of Money and Output," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 114, pp. 655–690.
- Eichenbaum, Martin, Nir Jaimovich, and Sergio Rebelo (2011) "Reference Prices, Costs, and Nominal Rigidities," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 101, pp. 234–62.

Gap

References V Gagnon, Etienne, David López-Salido, and Nicolas Vincent (2012) "Individual Price Adjustment along the Extensive Margin," *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2012, Volume* 27, pp. 235–281.

- Gautier, Erwan, Magali Marx, and Paul Vertier (2022) "The Transmission of Nominal Shocks when Prices are Sticky," unpublished manuscript.
- Gertler, Mark and Peter Karadi (2015) "Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic Activity," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, Vol. 7, pp. 44–76.
- Gilchrist, Simon and Egon Zakrajšek (2012) "Credit Spreads and Business Cycle
  - Fluctuations," American Economic Review, Vol. 102, pp. 1692–1720.
- Golosov, Mikhail and Robert E. Lucas (2007) "Menu Costs and Phillips Curves," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 115, pp. 171–199.

References

References VI

Jarociński, Marek and Peter Karadi (2020) "Deconstructing Monetary Policy Surprises: the Role of Information Shocks," *American Economic Review: Macroeconomics*, Vol. 12, pp. 1–43.

Jordà, Òscar (2005) "Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 95, pp. 161–182.

Karadi, Peter and Adam Reiff (2019) "Menu Costs, Aggregate Fluctuations, and Large Shocks," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, Vol. 11, pp. 111–46.

Luo, Shaowen and Daniel Villar (2021) "The Price Adjustment Hazard Function: Evidence from High Inflation Periods," *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, Vol. 130, p. S0165188921000701. Gap

Literature

## References VII

Midrigan, Virgiliu (2011) "Menu Costs, Multiproduct Firms, and Aggregate Fluctuations," *Econometrica*, Vol. 79, pp. 1139–1180.

Nakamura, Emi and Jón Steinsson (2018) "High-Frequency Identification of Monetary Non-Neutrality: The Information Effect," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 133, pp. 1283–1330.

Petrella, Ivan, Emiliano Santoro, and Lasse P. Simonsen (2019) "Time-varying Price Flexibility and Inflation Dynamics," EMF Research Papers 28, Economic Modelling and Forecasting Group.

Woodford, Michael (2009) "Information-Constrained State-Dependent Pricing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 56, pp. S100–S124. IRi: data cleaning

Posted prices:

$$P_{psw} = \frac{TR_{psw}}{Q_{psw}},$$

- ► *TR* is the total revenue
- Q is the quantity sold for each product
- p in store s in week w

IRi: data cleaning

Posted prices:

$$P_{psw} = \frac{TR_{psw}}{Q_{psw}},$$

#### ► *TR* is the total revenue

- Q is the quantity sold for each product
- p in store s in week w
- Cleaning
  - Round to the nearest penny (8.7%)
  - Private label products: new products at relabeling
  - Drop products that are not available the whole year

References



► Sales: high-frequency noise (Anderson et al., 2017)



- Sales: high-frequency noise (Anderson et al., 2017)
- Modal-price filter of ?



Data

Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References

# IRi: sales-filtering

- Sales: high-frequency noise (Anderson et al., 2017)
- Modal-price filter of ?
- Reference prices P<sup>f</sup><sub>psw</sub> on weekly data
  - 13-week two-sided modal price
  - Iterative updating to align the change of  $P_{psw}^{f}$  with  $P_{psw}$
  - Reference price changes less than a third of posted price changes



Data

Selection

Robustness

Literature Conclusion

References

# IRi: sales-filtering

- Sales: high-frequency noise (Anderson et al., 2017)
- Modal-price filter of ?
- Reference prices P<sup>f</sup><sub>psw</sub> on weekly data
  - 13-week two-sided modal price
  - Iterative updating to align the change of  $P_{psw}^{f}$  with  $P_{psw}$
  - Reference price changes less than a third of posted price changes
- Results are robust to using posted prices

Robustness

Literature Conclusion

References

# IRi: sales-filtering

- Sales: high-frequency noise (Anderson et al., 2017)
- Modal-price filter of ?
- Reference prices P<sup>f</sup><sub>psw</sub> on weekly data
  - 13-week two-sided modal price
  - Iterative updating to align the change of  $P_{psw}^{f}$  with  $P_{psw}$
  - Reference price changes less than a third of posted price changes
- Results are robust to using posted prices
- Monthly prices P<sub>pst</sub>: mode of weekly prices



$$\omega_{psy} = \frac{TR_{psy}}{\sum_{p} \sum_{s} TR_{psy}}$$



$$\omega_{psy} = \frac{TR_{psy}}{\sum_{p} \sum_{s} TR_{psy}}$$



$$\omega_{psy} = \frac{TR_{psy}}{\sum_{p}\sum_{s}TR_{psy}}$$

• Posted and reference-price inflation (i = p, f)

$$\pi_t^i = \sum_s \sum_p \omega_{pst} \left( p_{pst}^i - p_{pst-1}^i \right)$$



$$\omega_{psy} = \frac{TR_{psy}}{\sum_{p} \sum_{s} TR_{psy}}$$

• Posted and reference-price inflation (i = p, f)

$$\pi_t^i = \sum_s \sum_p \omega_{pst} \left( p_{pst}^i - p_{pst-1}^i \right)$$

Sales-price inflation

$$\pi_t^s = \pi_t^p - \pi_t^f$$



$$\omega_{psy} = \frac{TR_{psy}}{\sum_{p} \sum_{s} TR_{psy}}$$

• Posted and reference-price inflation (i = p, f)

$$\pi_t^i = \sum_s \sum_p \omega_{pst} \left( p_{pst}^i - p_{pst-1}^i \right)$$

Sales-price inflation

$$\pi_t^s = \pi_t^p - \pi_t^f$$

Seasonal adjustment using monthly dummies



► Focus: aggregate shock - price-gap interaction term




- Focus: aggregate shock price-gap interaction term
- Price increases  $I_{pst}^+$ : expected sign is positive
  - Driven by products with negative gap  $(x_{pst-1} \leq 0)$
  - Credit tightening  $(\hat{ebp}_t \ge 0)$ : less price increases
  - Credit easing  $(\hat{ebp}_t < 0)$ : more price increases



- Focus: aggregate shock price-gap interaction term
- Price increases  $I_{pst}^+$ : expected sign is positive
  - Driven by products with negative gap  $(x_{pst-1} \leq 0)$
  - Credit tightening  $(\hat{ebp}_t \ge 0)$ : less price increases
  - Credit easing  $(\hat{ebp}_t < 0)$ : more price increases
- Price decreases I<sup>-</sup><sub>pst</sub>: expected sign is positive
  - Driven by products with positive gap  $(x_{pst-1} \ge 0)$
  - Credit tightening  $(\hat{ebp}_t \ge 0)$ : more price decreases
  - Credit easing  $(\hat{bp}_t < 0)$ : less price decreases



#### Posted, reference and sales-price indices





#### IRi supermarket index

Similar business-cycle fluctuations as CPI food-at-home



#### IRi supermarket index

- Similar business-cycle fluctuations as CPI food-at-home
- Trend inflation lower than CPI food-at-home
  - Main reason: new products
  - Higher-quality higher-price than existing products
  - CPI takes this into account we only use surviving products

Data Gap

Credit shock


Selection

Robustness


Literature

References


#### Estimated empirical hazards




Campbell and Eden (2014)



#### Eichenbaum et al. (2011)



Gautier et al. (2022)






Robustness

Literature Conclusion


References

## Estimated empirical hazard: Eichenbaum et al. (2011)




Percentage deviations of hypothetical markup from average markup

Competitors' price gap, frequency, with and without heterogeneity



Literature

Competitors' price gap vs. competitors' reset-price gap, frequency





Additional interest





Additional interest

- Impact of the price gap  $\beta_{xh}$ : expected sign: negative for  $I_{pst}^+$  (positive for  $I_{pst}^-$ )
  - More negative gap: more price increases
  - (More positive gap: more price decreases)



- Additional interest
- Impact of the price gap  $\beta_{xh}$ : expected sign: negative for  $I_{pst}^+$  (positive for  $I_{pst}^-$ )
  - More negative gap: more price increases
  - (More positive gap: more price decreases)
- ▶ Impact of aggregate shock  $\beta_{ih}$ : expected sign: negative for  $I_{pst}^+$  (positive for  $I_{pst}^-$ )
  - Credit tightening  $(\hat{ebp}_t > 0)$  less increases, more decreases
  - Credit easing  $(\hat{ebp}_t < 0)$  more increases, less decreases

Robustness

Literature Conclusion

References

# Specification, cont.

2 additional specifications for robustness





- 2 additional specifications for robustness
- Time-fixed effects (drop the direct impact of shock)

- 2 additional specifications for robustness
- Time-fixed effects (drop the direct impact of shock)
- Separate coefficients for positive and negative gaps

Literature

References

## Results, competitors' price gap, credit shock, h=24m

Gap

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Price increase $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+}\right)$			Price decrease $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{-}\right)$		
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	$-1.75^{***}$	-1.75***		1.55***	1.55***	
Shock ( $ebp_t$ )	-0.03***			0.03***		
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.00		0.01	0.01	
Age $(T_{pst-1})$	0.02***	0.02***		0.00**	0.01***	
Pos. gap $(x_{pst-1}^+)$						
Neg. gap $(x_{pst-1}^{-})$						
Pos. sel. $(x_{pst-1}^+ \hat{ebp})$						
Neg. sel. $(x_{pst-1}^{-}\hat{ebp})$						
Product × store FE	1	1		1	1	
Calendar-month FE	1	×		1	x	
Time FE	×	1		x	1	
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>		16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	
within R <sup>2</sup>	18.5%	16.6%		17.3%	16.4%	

Gap

Selection

Literature

References

### Results, competitors' price gap, credit shock, h=24m

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Price increase $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^+\right)$			Price decrease $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{-}\right)$			
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-1.75***		1.55***	1.55***		
Shock (ebp <sub>t</sub> )	-0.03***		-0.04***	0.03***		0.03***	
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.00		0.01	0.01		
Age $(T_{pst-1})$	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.00**	0.01***	0.01***	
Pos. gap $(x_{pst-1}^+)$			-2.26***			2.29***	
Neg. gap $(x_{pst-1}^{-})$			$-1.44^{***}$			1.10***	
Pos. sel. $(x_{pst-1}^+ e\hat{b}p)$			0.04			-0.04	
Neg. sel. $(x_{pst-1}^{-} \hat{ebp})$			-0.03			0.04	
Product × store FE	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Calendar-month FE	1	×	1	1	×	1	
Time FE	×	1	×	×	1	×	
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	
within $R^2$	18.5%	16.6%	18.9%	17.3%	16.4%	18.2%	


Robustness

Literature Conclusion

References

Gap group-dummies, within product-store, 24m

- Hazard close to linear and quite symmetric
  - Heterogeneity is controlled for (item, time FEs)
  - Predicted frequency in 24 months





Price decreases

Motivation	Framework	Data	Gap	Credit shock	Selection	Robustness	Literature	Conclusion	References

#### Average moments

Annualize	ed inflation	Freq	uency		
Posted	Reference	Posted	Reference		
1.84 %	1.75%	36.2%	10.8%		
Reference	e frequency	Reference size			
Increase	Decrease	Increase	Decrease		
6.6%	4.2%	12.5%	-15.1%		

Framework Data Gap

Motivation

Credit shock

Selection


Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References

Data: response from shift from increases to decreases Expressions





Micro-data: how do standard moments adjust to aggregate shocks • Average moments



- ► Micro-data: how do standard moments adjust to aggregate shocks Average moments
- ► Frequency:

$$\xi_{t,t+h}^{\pm} = \sum_{i} \overline{\omega}_{it,t+h} I_{it,t+h}^{\pm},$$





► Micro-data: how do standard moments adjust to aggregate shocks • Average moments

► Frequency:

$$\xi_{t,t+h}^{\pm} = \sum_{i} \overline{\omega}_{it,t+h} I_{it,t+h}^{\pm},$$



$$\psi_{t,t+h}^{\pm} = \frac{\sum_{i} \overline{\omega}_{it,t+h} I_{it,t+h}^{\pm} (p_{it+h} - p_{it-1})}{\xi_{t,t+h}^{\pm}}.$$





Micro-data: how do standard moments adjust to aggregate shocks Average moments

► Frequency:

$$\xi_{t,t+h}^{\pm} = \sum_{i} \overline{\omega}_{it,t+h} I_{it,t+h}^{\pm},$$

Size

$$\psi_{t,t+h}^{\pm} = \frac{\sum_{i} \overline{\omega}_{it,t+h} I_{it,t+h}^{\pm} (p_{it+h} - p_{it-1})}{\xi_{t,t+h}^{\pm}}.$$

Decomposition

$$p_{t+h} - p_{t-1} = \pi_{t,t+h} = \xi_{t,t+h}^+ \psi_{t,t+h}^+ + \xi_{t,t+h}^- \psi_{t,t+h}^-,$$






Price level

#### Cumulative frequency


#### Cumulative size





Price level

#### Cumulative frequency



Average size declines

25


20

15

months

Cumulative size






Average size declines

 In line with both time-dependent (Calvo, 1983) and state-dependent (Golosov and Lucas, 2007) models

Literature

# Time-dependent model (Calvo, 1983)





Motivation	Framework	Data	Gap	Credit shock	Selection	Robustness	Literature	Conclusion	References

# Nonlinearity II: Probit

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Multinon	nial probit	Ordered probit
	Incr. $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+}\right)$	Decr. $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{-}\right)$	Change ( <i>I<sub>pst,t+24</sub></i> )
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-3.15***	3.37***	-4.24***
Shock $(ebp_t)$	$-0.11^{***}$	0.05***	$-0.10^{***}$
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.05	-0.21**	0.04
Age $(T_{pst-1})$	0.01*	-0.03***	0.02***
Freq. incr. $(\xi^+_{psM})$	5.17***	2.91***	1.79***
Freq. decr. $(\xi^{psM})$	3.02***	5.84***	-1.33***
Product × store FE	×	×	×
Calendar-month FE	1	1	1
Time FE	X	×	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	14.3 <i>M</i>

Credit shock

Selection Ro

Robustness


Literature

Conclusion

References

Heterogeneity across product categories

Heterogeneous demand elasticities might bias our baseline



Selection R

Robustness

Literature

Selection

Conclusion

References

#### Heterogeneity across product categories

- Heterogeneous demand elasticities might bias our baseline
- Separate estimates across product categories: price increases

Effect Size Effect Size Effect Size with 95% CI category with 95% CI with 95% CI category category all -0 -0.00 [ -0.09, 0.09] all -1.75[-1.88, -1.62] all --0.03 [ -0.05, -0.02] 0.05 [ -0.09, 0.19] -2.991-3.03. -2.95 0.011-0.00. 0.03 beer beer beer blades -0.06 [ -0.15, 0.04] -1.94 [ -1.99. -1.88] 0.001-0.01. 0.02 bledes bledes carbbey 0.01 [ -0.07, 0.09] -1.55 [ -1.57, -1.52] -0.02 [-0.05, -0.00] carbbeo carbbeo coldoer -0.01 [ -0.15, 0.13] coldce -1.82 [ -1.86, -1.78] coldcer -0.05 [ -0.08, -0.02] 0.04 [ -0.03, 0.10] -1.66 [ -1.72, -1.61] deod 0.01[-0.01, 0.02] deod deod factiss -0.02 [ -0.13, 0.09] -1.72[-1.79. -1.64] -0.05 [ -0.09. -0.01] factiss factise -0.02 [ -0.17, 0.14] fzdinent -1.58 [ -1.63. -1.53] tzdinen tzdinen --0.04 [ -0.05. -0.02] fzpizze -0.09 [ -0.22, 0.04] fzpizza -1.51 [ -1.54, -1.48] fzpizza -0.05 [ -0.09, -0.01] hholean 0.04 [ -0.05, 0.12] hhclear -2.25 [ -2.30, -2.21] hhclear -0.01 [ -0.03, 0.01] hotdoc 0.03 [ -0.11. 0.18] hotdog -1.50 [ -1.55, -1.46] hotdog 0.00[-0.03, 0.03] laundet 0.08 [-0.07, 0.24] -2.08 [ -2.12. -2.04] laundet -0.01[-0.02, 0.01] 0.01 [ -0.15, 0.17] -1.68 [ -1.77. -1.59] . -0.03 [ -0.05. -0.00] mano mayo mayo mustketc 0.00 f -0.10, 0.101 mustketc -1.77 [ -1.82, -1.72] mustkeb . -0.03 [ -0.04, -0.01] paptowl 0.02 [ -0.20, 0.24] paptowl -1.89 [ -1.96, -1.82] paptowl . -0.04 [ -0.06, -0.01] peanbut -0.00 [ -0.26, 0.26] peanbutr -2.13 [ -2.26, -2.00] peanbut -0.06 [ -0.09, -0.03] . -0.22 [ -0.54, 0.10] -3.21 [ -3.35, -3.08] -0.03 [ -0.07, 0.01] razors razora razora 0.03 [ -0.05. 0.11] saltsnok -1.48 ( -1.52, -1.43) saltsnok --0.011-0.03. 0.001 saltsnck shame - 0 0.00 [ -0.08, 0.09] shamo -2.071-2.10. -2.04 shamp -0.00 [ -0.02, 0.01] soup \_\_\_\_ -0.03 [ -0.17, 0.11] soup -1.70 [ -1.74, -1.66] soup -0.05 [ -0.06, -0.03] -0.02[-0.14, 0.10] -1.85 [ -1.88, -1.82] spagsau -0.03 [ -0.05, -0.01] spagsauc \_\_\_\_ spagsau -0.02[-0.16, 0.13] sugarsub -2.32 [ -2.37, -2.26] sugarsub 0.00[-0.03, 0.03] sugarsub - toothbr -1.55 [ -1.59, -1.51] toothbr - 66 -0.021-0.03. -0.011 toothbr -0.001-0.07.0.06 -1.84 [ -1.88. -1.80] toothoa . -0.02 [ -0.04. -0.01] toothna - 64 -0.01 [ -0.09, 0.06] toothpa 0.06 [ -0.10, 0.21] yogurt -2.07 [ -2.11, -2.04] yogurt . -0.03 [ -0.05, -0.01] vogurt -1.92 [ -2.08, -1.75] ٠ -0.02[-0.03, -0.01] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.02] 4 2 0 2 -3.5 -3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 - 05 - ń 05 - 6 Gap up Shock up Interaction up

Shock

Gap


Selection

Literature

References

#### Heterogeneity across product categories, cont.

Separate estimates across product categories: price decreases






Selection

Literature

References

#### Heterogeneity across product categories, cont.

Separate estimates across product categories: price decreases





Gap

Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References

Competitors' reset-price gap

Framework

Alternative price-gap proxy





- Alternative price-gap proxy
- $\blacktriangleright$  For the optimal price, only use those competitors' prices that changed in t






- Alternative price-gap proxy
- For the optimal price, only use those competitors' prices that changed in t
- Formally: Reference price-reset gap (x<sup>r</sup><sub>pst</sub>)

$$x_{pst}^{r} = p_{pst}^{f} - \overline{p}_{pt}^{fr} - \alpha_{sc}$$

- ►  $p_{pst}^{f}$ : reference price
- $\overline{p}_{pt}^{fr}$  average ref. price of changers
- $\alpha_{sc}$  store and category fixed effect



#### Competitors' reset price gap



Literature

References

### Results, competitors' reset-price gap, credit shock, h=24m

Gap

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Increa	ases $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+}\right)$	Decrea	ases $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{-}\right)$
	Baseline	Competitor-reset-gap	Baseline	Competitor-reset-gap
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-1.29***	1.55***	1.19***
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Shock ( $ebp_t$ )	-0.03***	-0.05***	0.03***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Selection $(x_{pst-1}\widehat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Age $(T_{\rho st-1})$	0.02***	0.02***	0.00**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Product × store FE	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	1	1	1
Time FE	×	×	x	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	9.3 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	9.3 <i>M</i>
Within $R^2$	18.5%	15.2%	17.3%	14.5%

Gap

Selection

Robustness

Literature Conclusion

References

# PPI microdata

Coverage

- 1981-2012 monthly data
- Representative of the US economy



Gap

Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References


# PPI microdata

Coverage

- 1981-2012 monthly data
- Representative of the US economy
- No sales filtering









► Size: clear negative relationship with the gaps





# PPI: gaps

Size: clear negative relationship with the gaps

- ► Frequency:
  - Increases with competitors' gap eventually
  - Initially decreases with higher gap



Selection

Robustness

Conclusion


Literature

25

25

References

#### Credit shock





Selection

Literature

References

### Results, competitors' price gap, credit shock, h=24m, PPI

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Increases $\left(I_{\rho}^{+}\right)$	st,t+24)	Decreases $\left(I_{p}\right)$	st,t+24)
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-0.23***	-0.23***	0.22***	0.22***
Shock (ebp <sub>t</sub> )	-0.023***		0.021***	
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Age $(T_{pst-1})$	0.035***	0.035***	0.01***	0.01***
Product × store FE	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	×	1	x
Time FE	×	1	×	1
N	9.7 <i>M</i>	9.7 <i>M</i>	9.7 <i>M</i>	9.7 <i>M</i>
Within R <sup>2</sup>	4.4%	3.5%	4.3%	3.7%



Results are robust using longer and wider-coverage data



- Results are robust using longer and wider-coverage data
- ► Gap: significant unconditional impact on frequency





- Results are robust using longer and wider-coverage data
- ► Gap: significant unconditional impact on frequency
- Aggregate shock: shifts the probability of adjustment



- Results are robust using longer and wider-coverage data
- ► Gap: significant unconditional impact on frequency
- Aggregate shock: shifts the probability of adjustment
- ► No selection:
  - No evidence of interaction:
  - Conditional on the shock, not adjusting prices with larger gap



Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks

- High-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks (Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018)
  - Intra-day financial market surprises around press statements
  - Control for information shocks using the co-movement of interest rates and stock prices (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020)



Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks

- High-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks (Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018)
  - Intra-day financial market surprises around press statements
  - Control for information shocks using the co-movement of interest rates and stock prices (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020)
- Calculate relevant price-setting moments



Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks

- High-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks (Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018)
  - Intra-day financial market surprises around press statements
  - Control for information shocks using the co-movement of interest rates and stock prices (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020)
- Calculate relevant price-setting moments
- Estimate impulse responses using local projections (Jordà, 2005)

High-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks

 Central bank announcements generate unexpected variation in interest rates: can be used to assess monetary non-neutrality.

### High-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks

- Central bank announcements generate unexpected variation in interest rates: can be used to assess monetary non-neutrality.
- Surprises
  - ▶ Measure change in interest rates in a 30-minute window around policy announcements
  - Only central bank announcements systematically impacts surprises

### High-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks

- Central bank announcements generate unexpected variation in interest rates: can be used to assess monetary non-neutrality.
- Surprises
  - ▶ Measure change in interest rates in a 30-minute window around policy announcements
  - Only central bank announcements systematically impacts surprises
- FOMC press statements (8 times a year)

Selection


Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References

# High-frequency surprises







#### Interest rate

> Preferred interest rate: 3-months federal funds futures rate

- Closely controlled by the FOMC
- Incorporates next FOMC meeting: with near-term forward guidance
- Does not affected by 'timing' surprises
- It stays active after ZLB is reached

Credit shock

Selection I

Robustness

Conclusion

Literature

References

# Controlling for central bank information shocks

- Issue: announcements can reveal information
  - not just about policy,
  - but also about the central bank's economic outlook.



Selection

Robustness

Conclusion

Literature

References

# Controlling for central bank information shocks

- Issue: announcements can reveal information
  - not just about policy,
  - but also about the central bank's economic outlook.
- Use responses in stock markets (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020) Scatter
  - ▶ Negative co-movement in interest rates and stock prices: monetary policy shocks
  - Positive co-movement: central bank information shocks



Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References

# Controlling for central bank information shocks

- Issue: announcements can reveal information
  - not just about policy,
  - but also about the central bank's economic outlook.
- Use responses in stock markets (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020) Scatter
  - ▶ Negative co-movement in interest rates and stock prices: monetary policy shocks
  - Positive co-movement: central bank information shocks
- ▶ 'Poor man's sign restriction': use events when the co-movement was negative



Local projections

Run a series of OLS regressions h (Jordà, 2005)

$$x_{t+h} - x_t = \alpha_h + \beta_h \Delta i_t + \Gamma_h \Psi(L) X_t + u_{t,h},$$

- x: variable of interest, e.g. (log) price level
- $\Delta i_t$ : high-frequency monetary policy shock
- $\Gamma_h \Psi(L) X_t$ : set of controls: various lags of cpi, ip, dely

Impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy tightening

Selection

Robustness

Literature

Conclusion

References


Credit shock

Motivation

Framework

Data

Gap




Conclusion

Impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy tightening








Aggregate frequency drops





Aggregate frequency drops

► Size declines




Robustness

Literature

References

#### Less increases more decreases



Selection

Literature


### Results, competitors' price gap, MP shock, h=12m

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Price i	ncreases $(I_{pst,t+}^+)$	12)	Price d	lecreases $(I_{pst,t+}^{-})$	12)
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	$-1.71^{***}$	$-1.71^{***}$		1.36***	1.36***	
Shock $(\Delta i_t)$	-0.03*		-0.03	0.01*		0.01*
Selection $(x_{pst-1}\Delta i_t)$	-0.07	-0.07		0.07	0.07	
Age $(T_{pst-1})$	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01**
Positive gap $(x_{pst-1}^+)$			-1.92***			1.93**
Negative gap $(x_{pst-1}^{-})$			$-1.58^{***}$			1.01**
Pos. selection $(x_{pst-1}^+ \Delta i_t)$			-0.05			0.05
Neg. selection $(x_{pst-1}^{-} \Delta i_t)$			-0.08			0.08
Product × store FE	1	1	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	×	1	1	×	1
Time FE	×	1	×	×	1	×
N	23.7M	23.7M	23.7M	23.7M	23.7M	23.7M
Within R <sup>2</sup>	16.4%	14.7%	16.5%	13.3%	12.7%	13.8%



#### MP shock: selection

Robustly no evidence for selection



#### MP shock: selection

- Robustly no evidence for selection
- Significant shift in adjustment probability in supermarket prices

Framework

Gap

Selection

Robustness

Conclusion

Literature

References

### Robustness to dropping fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Increases (	$I_{pst,t+24}^+$	Decreases (	$I_{pst,t+24}^{-}$
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-0.99***	1.55***	0.90**
Shock ( $ebp_t$ )	-0.03***	-0.04***	0.03***	0.03**
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02
Age $(T_{pst-1})$	0.02***	$-0.01^{**}$	0.00**	-0.03**
Product × store FE	1	×	1	×
Calendar-month FE	1	1	1	1
Time FE	X	×	×	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>
Within $R^2$	18.5%	8.9%	17.3%	9.3%

### Robustness to using posted prices

	(1) Increases (1	(2)	(3) Decreases (	(4)
	Reference Posted		Reference	Posted
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-1.46***	1.55***	1.25***
Shock ( $ebp_t$ )	-0.03***	-0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02
Age $(T_{pst-1})$	0.02***	0.01***	0.00**	$-0.01^{***}$
Product × store FE	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	1	1	1
Time FE	×	×	×	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	18.6 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	18.6 <i>M</i>
Within R <sup>2</sup>	18.5%	17.6%	17.3%	14.8%

Selection F

Robustness

Literature Conclusion

References

### Robustness to excluding the Great Recession

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Increases $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+}\right)$		Decreases $\left( \textit{I}_{\textit{pst},t+24}^{-}  ight)$	
	2001-2012	2001-2007	2001-2012	2001-2007
$Gap\;(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-1.74***	1.55***	1.50***
Shock $(ebp_t)$	-0.03***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	0.06	0.01	-0.06
Age ( $T_{pst-1}$ )	0.02***	0.02***	0.00**	0.01***
$Product \times store \; FE$	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	1	1	1
Time FE	×	×	×	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	9.9 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	9.9 <i>M</i>
Within $R^2$	18.5%	17.7%	17.3%	16.5%