Discussion of Jorge Abad, Galo Nuno, Carlos Thomas'

"CBDC and the operational framework of monetary policy"

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Questions

CBDC is high on the agenda of many central banks

implementation framework impacts the consequences of CBDC

• This paper is one exception

... many papers studied the macro impact of CBDC, few study how the MP

Main results

- 3. Even if tiny, remunerating CBDC can undo the negative effects

1. As long as the CB operates a floor system, CBDC has a minor impact on the economy (CBDC take-up = 20% of GDP -> reduction in capital <1%)

2. Introducing CBDC has a small contractionary effect, lowering inflation

Set up (timeline)

Households

 (M, D^{CB}, K)

t

Bank/Firm









Households (D, M, D^{CB}, K)

Bank/Firm D





Households (D, M, D^{CB}, K)

Bank/Firm D

Government/CB

t+1



Interbank Market



Households (D, M, D^{CB}, K)

Bank/Firm D





Households (D, M, D^{CB}, K)

Bank/Firm







Interbank Market

Set up (timeline)



Interbank Market Directed search

Set up (timeline)





Households (D, M, D^{CB}, K) Bank/Firm D



A "modern" Poole (1968) model

$P(\omega)E[\omega R^K]$

 $R^{D} = P(\boldsymbol{\omega}) \left(\mu^{B}(\theta) R^{IB}(\theta) + (1 - \mu^{B}(\theta)) R^{LF} \right)$

+ $P(\boldsymbol{\omega})(\mu^{L}(\theta)R^{IB}(\theta) + (1 - \mu^{L}(\theta))R^{DF})$

 $R^{IB}(\theta) = W(\theta)Average(R^{LF}, R^{DF})$

R^{LF}





Demand for currency

2. As $\eta_D > 0 \longrightarrow D^{DC} \uparrow$ while $D, M \downarrow$









- 2. Agents substitute remunerated D by unremunerated D^{DC} (when $\eta_D \uparrow$)
- 3. wealth $W \downarrow$
- borrow: bank equity \downarrow)
- 5. Macro effects?

4. Aggregate constraint $K \downarrow$ since $K + \overline{B} = W +$ bank equity (and more expensive to



Macro effects are tiny





Macro effects are tiny



CBDC limit=3'000 GDP drops by 0.15%

8%



Macro effects are tiny



Remunerating CBDC undoes the negative effects by maintaining W

CBDC limit=3'000 GDP drops by 0.15%

8%



Lift-off depends on matching frictions

- 1. Using same set-up, Arce, Nuno, Thaler, Thomas (JME, 2020) estimate matching parameter to $\lambda = 225$ (data: 1999-2017)
- 2. This paper estimates $\lambda = 76$ (data: 1999-2019 / more frictions). Does it matter?
- 3. Previous version of this paper with $\lambda = 178$, Liftoff for CBDC = 8% GDP
- 4. Robustness?

Comments 1

although matters)

results? (the lift off results are sensitive to the matching frictions)

Still a macro-ish contribution on CBDC (not much on the money market,

Interbank market could be made simpler and still the macro results would obtain

• EU interbank market is notoriously segmented : how would that impact the

• Lean CB-BS: How would results change (quantitatively) in corridor system?



Comments 2

Introducing (unremunerated) CBDC is contractionary

Because it negatively impacts the (purchasing) wealth of households

• Give an estimate for the CBDC remuneration rate that undoes that effect!

find there is)

Is there a remuneration rate that is expansionary? (Lamersdorf, Linzert, Monnet



Conclusion

- Good news:
 - volume
 - 3K limit may be just maintaining floor (more robustness)

 - Remunerating CBDC can undo the (tiny) negative effects of CBDC

- **Bad news:**
 - The digital euro will not be remunerated

• CBDC does not hamper the functioning of money markets, if anything will increase

• CBDC has tiny macro effects and it is not inflationary (more on this would be good!)



Thank you!

