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Níl an t-ábhar seo ar fáil i nGaeilge.

Alper Kara

21 March 2024
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2920
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Abstract
We examine rating behaviour after the introduction of new regulations regarding Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in the European securitisation market. Employing a large sample of 12,469 ABS tranches issued between 1998 and 2018, we examine the information content of yield spreads of ABS at the issuance and compare the pre- and post-GFC periods. We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest between issuers and CRAs in securitisation. Rating catering seems to have disappeared in the post-GFC period. Yet we see limited effectiveness on rating shopping. It follows that rating over-reliance might be an issue, especially for investors of higher-quality ABS.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
7 February 2019
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2236
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Abstract
We examine the link between issuer reputation and mortgage-backed security (MBS) performance using a sample of 4,247 European MBS issued between 1999 and 2007. We measure performance with credit rating downgrades and delinquencies and track their changes over the long term. We find that, overall, MBS sold by reputable issuers are collateralised by higher quality asset pools which have lower delinquency rates and are less likely to be downgraded. However, as credit standards declined during the boom period of 2005-2007, asset pools securitized by reputable issuers were of worse quality compared to those securitized by less reputable issuers. Therefore, reputation as a self-disciplining mechanism failed to incentivise the production of high quality securities during the credit boom.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
1 February 2017
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2009
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Abstract
Banks are usually better informed on the loans they originate than other financial intermediaries. As a result, securitized loans might be of lower credit quality than otherwise similar non-securitized loans. We assess the effect of securitization activity on loans
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
20 July 2011
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1362
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Abstract
We investigate the effect of securitization activity on banks’ lending standards using evidence from pricing behavior on the syndicated loan market. We find that banks more active at originating asset-backed securities are also more aggressive on their loan pricing practices. This suggests that securitization activity lead to laxer credit standards. Macroeconomic factors also play a large role explaining the impact of securitization activity on bank lending standards: banks more active in the securitization markets loosened more aggressively their lending standards in the run up to the recent financial crisis but also tightened more strongly during the crisis period. As a continuum of this paper we are examining whether individual loans that are eventually securitized are priced more aggressively by using unique European data on individual loans from all major trustees.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
10 March 2009
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1028
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Abstract
Following the introduction of the euro, the markets for large debt financing experienced a historical expansion. We investigate the financial factors behind the issuance of syndicated loans for an extensive sample of euro area non-financial corporations. For the first time we compare these factors to those of its major competitor: the corporate bond market. We find that large firms, with greater financial leverage, more (verifiable) profits and higher liquidation values tend to prefer syndicated loans. In contrast, firms with larger levels of short-term debt and those perceived by markets as having more growth opportunities favour financing through corporate bonds.
JEL Code
D40 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→General
F30 : International Economics→International Finance→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages