Съдържанието не е налично на български език.
Anton van der Kraaij
- 15 May 2024
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2024Details
- Abstract
- The emergence of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools represents a significant technological leap forward, with the potential to have a substantial impact on the financial system. Conceptually, AI brings both benefits and risks to the financial system. Practically, the overall impact will depend on how the challenges related to data, model development and deployment are addressed – both at the level of financial institutions and for the financial system as a whole. If new AI tools are used widely in the financial system and AI suppliers are concentrated, operational risk (including cyber risk), market concentration and too-big-to-fail externalities may increase. Furthermore, widespread AI adoption may harbour the potential for increased herding behaviour and market correlation. Should concerns arise that cannot be tackled by the current regulatory framework, targeted initiatives may need to be considered.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G41 : Financial Economics
- 18 April 2024
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 346Details
- Abstract
- A digital euro would provide the general public with an additional means of payment in the form of risk-free central bank money in digital form that is universally accepted for digital payments across the euro area. A digital euro would offer a wide range of financial stability benefits, including safeguarding the role of public money and strengthening the strategic autonomy and monetary sovereignty of the euro area in the digital era. It would be designed to have no material impact on financial stability or the transmission of monetary policy. This paper shows the usefulness of digital euro safeguards, such as holding limits, that would limit the impact of the introduction of a digital euro on banks’ liquidity and on their reliance on central bank funding. To this end, it assesses how banks might respond to the introduction of a digital euro while seeking to maximise profitability and manage their risks for a range of holding limit scenarios. The results of the simulated impact on key liquidity metrics show that, with safeguards in place and on aggregate, the liquidity metrics of euro area banks would decline but remain well above regulatory minimums. In addition, the central bank funding ratios of euro area banks would not increase materially on aggregate and would remain contained overall.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 11 July 2022
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 18Details
- Abstract
- Some crypto-assets have a significant carbon footprint and are estimated to consume a similar amount of energy each year to individual countries like Spain, the Netherlands or Austria. As the mining and expansion of these crypto-assets are fully dependent on energy supply, their valuation is particularly vulnerable to jurisdictions’ climate policies. Increasing financial exposures to such crypto-assets are therefore likely to contribute to increased transition risk for the financial system. This article provides an overview of the estimated carbon footprint of certain crypto-assets such as bitcoin and its causes. It also discusses the primary policy role of public authorities, which need to evaluate whether the outsized carbon footprint of certain crypto-assets undermines their green transition commitments. Finally, it analyses policy options for prudential standard-setters and the need for climate-related considerations in crypto-investors’ practices.
- JEL Code
- G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 24 May 2022
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2022Details
- Abstract
- The stellar growth, volatility and financial innovation currently seen in the crypto-asset ecosystem, as well as the rising involvement of institutional investors, show how important it is to gain a better understanding of the potential risks crypto-assets could pose to financial stability if trends continue on this trajectory. This special feature provides an update on crypto-asset market developments and a general overview of risks stemming from unbacked crypto-assets and decentralised finance, given the way in which they have evolved and their specific characteristics and risks. Systemic risk increases in line with the level of interconnectedness between crypto-assets and the traditional financial sector, the use of leverage and lending activity. It is important to close regulatory and data gaps in the crypto-assets ecosystem to mitigate such systemic risks.
- JEL Code
- G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G19 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Other
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G51 : Financial Economics
- 17 November 2021
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2021Details
- Abstract
- The market capitalisation of stablecoins has increased from USD 5 billion to USD 120 billion since 2020. Despite their recent growth, stablecoins still only account for around 6% of the estimated USD 2 trillion total market capitalisation of crypto-assets, though interlinkages between stablecoins and crypto-assets imply a correlation of risks between these market segments. At the same time, the functions served by stablecoins within the ecosystem have multiplied. In addition to acting as a relatively safe “parking space” for crypto volatility, stablecoins serve as a bridge between fiat currencies and crypto-assets and are used for trading or as collateral in crypto-asset derivative transactions or in decentralised finance. Against this background of stablecoins’ interlinkages with the wider crypto-asset market and their direct links to the traditional financial system, this box analyses the risks associated with the evolving functions of stablecoins and the financial stability implications of such risks. It concludes that while stablecoins currently pose limited financial stability risks in the euro area, their growing size, usage and connected infrastructure may alter this assessment in the future. Nevertheless it highlights that the global reach of this market underscores the need for global standard-setting bodies to further assess the extent to which existing standards are appropriate for, and applicable to, stablecoins and close any gaps as necessary.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
G13 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Contingent Pricing, Futures Pricing
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 5 May 2020
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 10Details
- Abstract
- Stablecoins provide an alternative to volatile crypto-assets. Depending on their asset management function, they may fall under different regulatory regimes or – with certain design features – under none at all. Given their potential size, global stablecoins could pose risks to financial stability. Such arrangements need a robust regulatory framework.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 24 May 2018
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2018Details
- Abstract
- This box assesses potential financial stability concerns related to the rapidly growing market for crypto-assets. Crypto-assets (e.g. bitcoin, ether and ripple) are a new, innovative and high-risk digital asset class.21 Recent price developments and market interest in crypto-assets have given rise to concerns about potential financial stability implications. This box presents key facts on crypto-assets, concluding that they do not currently pose a material risk to financial stability in the euro area, but warrant careful monitoring.
- 2 February 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2010Details
- Abstract
- We present a tractable framework to assess the systemic implications of bail-in. To this end, we construct a multi-layered network model where each layer represents the securities cross holdings of a specific seniority among the largest euro area banking groups. On this basis, the bail-in of a bank can be simulated to identify the direct contagion risk to the other banks in the network. We find that there is no direct contagion to creditor banks. Spill-overs also tend to be small due to low levels of securities cross-holdings in the interbank network. We also quantify the impact of a bail-in on the different liability holders. In the baseline scenario, shareholders and subordinated creditors are always affected by the bail-in, senior unsecured creditors in 75% of the cases. Finally, we compute the effect of the bail-in on the network topology in each layer. We find that a bail-in significantly reshapes interbank linkages within specific seniority layers.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
- 24 May 2016
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2016Details
- Abstract
- The new bail-in tool in the EU bank resolution toolkit is an important step forward to safeguard financial stability in Europe, notably in relation to mitigating moral hazard and other problems inherent in a strong reliance on bailouts. At the same time, it is important to understand the potential contagion channels in the financial system following a bail-in and prior to resolution in order to assess potential systemic implications of the use of the bail-in tool. This special feature outlines salient features of the new requirements and then presents a multi-layered network model of banks’ bail-inable securities that could help in gauging potential contagion risk and, prior to a resolution, identifying mitigating measures to avoid systemic implications.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General