The European exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) as a preparatory phase on the path towards euro adoption – the cases of Bulgaria and Croatia

Prepared by Ettore Dorrucci, Michael Fidora, Christine Gartner and Tina Zumer

Published as part of the ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 8/2020.

Following the completion of a roadmap agreed over the past few years among all relevant EU stakeholders, the Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna were included in the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) on 10 July 2020. Their inclusion marks a milestone towards future enlargement of the euro area, given the important role that ERM II plays as a preparatory phase for euro adoption. Participation in ERM II may lead to a regime shift in the country concerned, i.e. it may alter the incentives of international and local investors and of the national authorities.

We provide evidence that a regime shift indeed occurred in the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) that joined the mechanism in 2004 and 2005. If supported by sound economic policies, this shift may have positive consequences, such as accelerating the convergence process. Conversely, the implementation of ill-advised policy measures may contribute to a build-up of economic imbalances. The article also looks at ERM II from a historical perspective, reviews its main features and procedures and explains the new roadmap towards participation in ERM II – and, simultaneously, European banking union – that was established and successfully implemented for Bulgaria and Croatia.

The main conclusion of the article is that in order to fully reap the benefits of monetary integration and ensure their own smooth participation in the mechanism, countries need sound policies, governance and institutions which allow them to address risks with adequate macroeconomic, macroprudential, supervisory and structural measures.

1 Introduction

Two EU Member States, Bulgaria and Croatia, joined ERM II on 10 July 2020. The process began in 2017 along a roadmap that reflected lessons learned from other countries’ experiences, the advent of European banking union and a careful assessment of country-specific strengths and vulnerabilities.^[1] The roadmap was agreed between the Bulgarian and Croatian authorities and the ERM II parties – the finance ministers of the euro area countries, the ECB, Denmark’s Finance Minister and the Governor of Danmarks Nationalbank.^[2] These stakeholders took their decisions following a common procedure involving the European Commission and consultation of the Economic and Financial Committee in its euro area format, known as the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG).

The inclusion of the Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna in ERM II is a milestone towards further enlargement of the euro area. Bulgaria and Croatia are expected to adopt the euro once they have fulfilled the necessary requirements (the “Maastricht” convergence criteria) as assessed in the Convergence Reports of the European Commission and the ECB.^[3]

For Bulgaria and Croatia, ERM II will therefore serve not only as an exchange rate arrangement, but also as a preparatory phase for euro adoption. ERM II has two main purposes. The first is to act as an arrangement for managing exchange rates between the participating currencies, thus also contributing to the smooth functioning of the single European market by fostering exchange rate stability. The second is to assist the convergence assessment provided for in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) with regard to the adoption of the euro by non-euro area EU Member States, with the exception of Denmark, which has a special status.^[4] In this way, ERM II offers a testing ground before the adoption of the euro, as the economies of the participating Member States operate under a regime of stable exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro (market test) and are expected to further strengthen their macroeconomic, macroprudential, supervisory and structural policies (policy test), with the support of ever-evolving economic governance from the European Union.

This article looks at the participation of the Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna in ERM II, focusing on the mechanism’s role as a bridge from domestic currencies towards the euro. Specifically, Section 2 briefly reviews the history, main features and procedures of ERM II. Section 3 argues on the basis of quantitative evidence that ERM II may lead to a regime shift in participating countries on the path to euro adoption. Section 4 explains the roadmap towards ERM II participation that was established and implemented for Bulgaria and Croatia. Finally, Section 5 concludes by highlighting the way ahead and the key challenges faced by Bulgaria and Croatia on the path towards euro adoption.

2 The history, main features and procedures of ERM II

2.1 History

With the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999, ERM II replaced the original exchange rate mechanism, which was one of the components of the European Monetary System (EMS) in place since 13 March 1979.^[5] The original ERM, a core element of the EMS, was aimed at reducing exchange rate variability and fostering monetary stability among the currencies of an initial eight Member States. With the introduction of the euro, the Danish krone and the Greek drachma were included in the new mechanism, ERM II. After Greece adopted the euro in 2001, Denmark was the only non-euro area EU Member State participating in the mechanism until 2004 (see Chart 1).

Chart 1

Exchange rate regimes of EU Member States since the start of the European Monetary System

On 1 May 2004 ten new Member States joined the European Union and their national central banks (NCBs) became part of the ERM II Central Bank Agreement. On 28 June 2004, soon after EU enlargement, the Estonian kroon, the Lithuanian litas and the Slovenian tolar were added to ERM II. On 2 May 2005 the Cyprus pound, the Latvian lats and the Maltese lira joined the mechanism, followed by the Slovak koruna on 28 November 2005. Since then, all these countries have adopted the euro after “fulfilling their obligations regarding the achievement of economic and monetary union” (Article 140 of the TFEU), which included receiving positive convergence assessments from the ECB and the European Commission (see Chart 1).

2.2 Main features

ERM II was established by the European Council Resolution of 16 June 1997^[6], which stipulated that “The euro will be the centre of the new mechanism.” The main features of ERM II are (i) a central rate against the euro, (ii) a fluctuation band with a standard width of ±15% around the central rate, (iii) interventions at the margins of the agreed fluctuation band, and (iv) the availability of very short-term financing from the participating central banks. Participating NCBs may unilaterally commit themselves to tighter fluctuation bands (including currency board regimes) than those provided for by ERM II, without imposing any additional obligations on the other participating NCBs or the ECB.^[7] Interventions at the margins of the fluctuation bands are in principle automatic and unlimited, although the ECB and the participating NCBs can suspend them at any time if they conflict with the primary objective of maintaining price stability. During ERM II participation, realignments of the central rate or adjustments to the width of the fluctuation band may occur, for example if equilibrium exchange rates change over time. Such developments may take place not only during a process of real convergence, but also in the case of significant changes in external competitiveness or in the presence of inconsistent economic policies.

2.3 Main procedures

While ERM II is referred to in the Treaty as an integral part of the Maastricht exchange rate convergence criteria, the ERM II procedures and agreements are not based on the Treaty, since they are intergovernmental in nature. According to Article 2.3 of the European Council Resolution of 1997, the decisions regarding participation in ERM II – in particular, whether the currency of a country can be included in the mechanism with a certain central rate and fluctuation band – are taken by mutual agreement of the finance ministers of euro area countries, the ECB and the finance ministers and central bank governors of the non-euro area Member States participating in ERM II at any given time. The decisions are taken at the end of a process involving consultation of the EWG. The European Commission is also involved in this process; it participates in the relevant meetings, can be mandated particular tasks and is kept informed by the ERM II parties. As participation in ERM II is a precondition for the eventual introduction of the euro, all EU Member States with a derogation from the obligation to adopt the euro, i.e. all non-euro area Member States except Denmark, are expected to join the mechanism at some stage.

In the interests of all stakeholders, decisions regarding participation in ERM II are to be mutually agreed on the basis of a sound and thorough economic assessment conducted by the relevant parties, and in consultation with the European Commission, through a candid, in-depth exchange of views. The requirement for mutual agreement on ERM II participation means that there must be a consensus that the Member State concerned is pursuing effective stability-oriented policies consistent with smooth participation in the mechanism. All parties take part in the search for consensus in a positive spirit, and negotiations continue until there is an agreement acceptable to all. This is reflected in the policy position on ERM II adopted by the ECB’s Governing Council in 2003, which emphasises the need to take a holistic approach and to carry out a comprehensive analysis in the economic assessment.^[8]

3 The “regime shift” effect of ERM II on investor and policymaker behaviour

3.1 Motivation

The full benefits of euro adoption can only be enjoyed if adequate policy measures are in place, including at the national level.^[9] Attaining “a high degree of sustainable convergence” (Article 140 of the TFEU) is the most important precondition for the successful adoption of the euro. To this end, sound policies and an adequate level of institutional quality are of the essence. They are therefore given due consideration when assessing the readiness of a non-euro area EU Member State to participate in ERM II.

This is all the more important as participation in ERM II may affect the expectations and economic incentives of international and local investors, as well as those of the local policy authorities, in a regime shift that may in turn trigger various positive or negative dynamics. Progress in the process of monetary integration, as well as the prospect of adopting the euro, may improve international investor sentiment towards Member States joining ERM II. This may result in an acceleration of gross international financial inflows and, in turn, stronger domestic credit growth coupled with a significant improvement in financing conditions. While this may fuel a sustainable catching-up process, it may also provide the wrong sort of incentives if coupled with a weak institutional and business environment, potentially leading to misallocation of capital, postponement of necessary reforms and deterioration in the country’s adjustment capacity, for example. The ensuing build-up of imbalances might eventually exacerbate a possible international financial flow reversal.^[10]

Against this backdrop, several insights can be gained from the analysis of developments in international financial flows and credit growth in the countries which have joined ERM II in the past. The analysis focuses on the CEECs that joined ERM II in 2004 and 2005 and subsequently adopted the euro: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia. Section 3.2 compares their experiences with those of the EU Member States in the same region which have not yet participated in ERM II (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) or which joined the mechanism only very recently (Bulgaria and Croatia). Section 3.3 discusses some policy implications arising from this analysis.

3.2 Evidence

Following the accession of the above CEECs to the European Union, countries that participated in ERM II experienced a more pronounced international financial flow cycle than those which did not participate. Gross financial inflows as a share of GDP accelerated ahead of EU accession, which for some countries also coincided with the start of their participation in ERM II.^[11] However, countries that joined ERM II experienced a much stronger surge (see Charts 2 and 3). Gross financial inflows in ERM II countries peaked about three years after they joined ERM II, at an average of around 30% of GDP (see Chart 2). Conversely, gross financial inflows were more stable in the non-ERM II countries, remaining at between 5% and 10% of GDP following EU accession (see Chart 3). With the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007-08, which materialised in most of the observed countries about three to four years after EU accession, ERM II participants experienced a sharper financial flow reversal (see Charts 2 and 3).^[12] Supporting the quantitative evidence, internal econometric analysis on a sample of emerging market and (former) transition economies shows that the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate regime does not affect financial inflows to these countries, whereas ERM II participation is found to increase the magnitude of gross financial inflows. At the same time, the results suggest that EU accession is not relevant in explaining the financial inflows recorded.^[13]

Chart 2

Gross international financial inflows of CEECs before and after joining ERM II

(as a percentage share of GDP; unweighted averages)

Chart 3

Gross international financial inflows of CEECs not participating in ERM II before and after joining the European Union

(as a percentage share of GDP; unweighted averages)

The differences in gross international financial inflows between the CEECs participating in ERM II and other CEECs were driven largely by bank lending and, to a lesser extent, by inward foreign direct investment (FDI). The largest share of financial flows to ERM II CEECs took the form of “other investment”, consisting mainly of bank lending to firms and households and flows within banking groups. While this may reflect the strong presence of foreign (mostly EU-based) banks in ERM II CEECs during that period, it was a common feature across the whole region. Conversely, the composition of international financial flows to non-ERM II CEECs was much more evenly distributed between FDI and other investment (see Charts 2 and 3).

After joining the mechanism, ERM II participants also experienced a stronger expansion in domestic credit and lower real interest rates than CEECs that did not join ERM II after their accession to the EU. Large international financial inflows, particularly in the form of bank credit and other interbank flows, can exacerbate the domestic credit cycle, for example by supporting funding for banks.^[14] Credit to the private sector as a share of GDP nearly doubled in ERM II countries in the five years after they joined the mechanism, while in the other CEECs the increase in credit stock was more gradual (see Chart 4). At the same time, ERM II countries experienced negative average short-term real interest rates in the three to four-year period after joining ERM II. In addition, the drop in long-term real interest rates was much stronger in ERM II countries than in non-ERM II countries (see Chart 5). While financially less-developed economies usually have lower domestic savings and therefore need financing from abroad in order to support economic growth and the overall catching-up process, this may pose a challenge for certain countries joining ERM II, as large international financial inflows are likely to fuel credit booms and busts.^[15] Moreover, credit booms can turn out to be more severe and difficult to contain in countries with fixed exchange rates, as the rising inflation typically associated with strong domestic demand lowers real interest rates further and this in turn triggers additional credit demand.

Chart 4

Domestic credit to the private sector in ERM II and non-ERM II CEECs

(as a percentage share of GDP; unweighted averages)

Chart 5

Real interest rates in ERM II and non-ERM II CEECs

(percentages)

3.3 Policy implications

Although the period following EU accession in 2004-05 fell within the environment of “Great Moderation”^[16], which is very different from the conditions prevailing today, the empirical findings discussed in the previous subsection nevertheless carry some general policy implications that may be of relevance for Bulgaria and Croatia, as well as for other EU Member States that seek ERM II participation in the future. ERM II participants may benefit from increased availability of capital, but they may also face an increased risk of a build-up of macroeconomic imbalances. Countries with large international financial inflows are indeed more likely to experience credit booms and busts as foreign financial inflows increase the available funds of the banking system, of which a significant share is often foreign-owned in central and eastern Europe.

Historical experience suggests that factors such as resilient economic structures^[17] and the quality of institutions and governance reduce the risk of economic imbalances and enhance the capacity of a country to cope with shocks. While the economic literature on this topic has mainly focused on the phase following euro adoption,^[18] the evidence discussed in the previous subsection suggests that similar dynamics might also materialise during the run-up to euro adoption.

Resilient economic structures create the preconditions for allocating capital to productive firms, thus supporting the catching-up process rather than the formation of bubbles. This also allows policymakers to resist pressures of vested interests against the implementation of necessary reforms, build up fiscal buffers during upturns and implement other countercyclical measures, including on the macroprudential side. Developments such as a surge in the most volatile components of international financial flows may provide the wrong sort of incentives in a weak institutional context, thus leading to the postponement of reforms and deterioration in the country’s adjustment capacity. This is not to deny that developing economies need to attract capital. However, if institutions are weak, such financial inflows are more likely to eventually become a disadvantage more than a benefit.

The smooth participation of a given currency in ERM II therefore requires the proper framework conditions to be in place at the national level. The prospect of joining ERM II and then the euro area should serve as an important incentive to improve policies, governance and institutions in order to attain convergence on a sustainable basis – in a similar manner to the incorporation of European law when joining the EU. If these improvements do not take place, excessive ease of financing after joining ERM II – and later after adopting the euro – risks reducing the incentives to make necessary reforms.

4 The Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna in ERM II

In the summers of 2018 and 2019 respectively, following discussions with the ERM II parties, the Bulgarian and Croatian authorities made a number of policy commitments in areas of high relevance for a smooth transition process and subsequent participation in ERM II. After fulfilment of these so-called prior policy commitments, as well as the announcement of post-entry policy commitments to be completed after joining ERM II, the two countries entered ERM II and European banking union simultaneously on 10 July 2020. This section explains the rationale for ERM II participation and the roadmap towards it that was implemented for these two EU Member States.

When Bulgaria and Croatia first expressed their interest in joining the mechanism, ERM II parties took account of three fundamental considerations.

First, it would be the first time a country had joined ERM II since the financial crisis, from which important lessons had been learned. As a result, the European institutional framework had been substantially overhauled over the previous decade and it was crucial not to overlook the lessons learned in future ERM II decisions. The resilience of economic structures, financial stability and the quality of institutions and governance had moved to the forefront of discussions, given their importance for the longer-term sustainability of euro adoption. In particular, the experiences of former ERM II participants had confirmed that these features needed to be in place to ensure smooth participation in the mechanism.

Second, it would also be the first time a Member State had joined ERM II since the start of European banking union. In banking union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism have direct powers over the banking system of the Member State concerned. Each Member State is required to enter banking union at the latest by the time it introduces the euro. Given that ERM II is a preparatory phase for euro adoption, joining ERM II today also means preparing for banking union. To this end, it was considered advisable for countries aiming to adopt the euro to enter into close cooperation with the ECB (see Box 1) at the same time as joining ERM II.^[19]

Third, there was also a need to take account of country-specific considerations. While both Bulgaria and Croatia had made significant progress in addressing macroeconomic imbalances and both countries had a track record of adjusting to adverse shocks under their own exchange rate regimes, there were concerns about their smooth participation in ERM II, owing to a number of remaining vulnerabilities.

In this context, the question arose as to how the aforementioned considerations could best be accommodated within the existing institutional and legal framework. EU Member States must be treated equally at any given stage of EMU, which implies that no preconditions or new rules can be imposed before a Member State applies for ERM II participation. Any Member State is, therefore, free to request the inclusion of its currency in ERM II at any time and make its policy commitments, as other Member States have done in the past. At the same time and in line with the procedure recalled in Section 2.3, ERM II parties may decide not to agree to that Member State’s ERM II participation in the event that the policy commitments and related actions taken by its national authorities do not sufficiently address the identified developments, concerns and risks. This approach is fully consistent with the ERM II framework.

During the informal phase of the roadmap towards ERM II participation, a dialogue was held between the ERM II parties and the Bulgarian and Croatian authorities on the risks that had been identified and how they could be mitigated. This dialogue clarified the policy commitments that the Bulgarian and Croatian authorities would have to make and fulfil when moving forward with the roadmap. Once this phase was completed, the last step in the roadmap was marked by the formal requests for the inclusion of the Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna in ERM II, which were sent the day before the decision was taken.

Some policy commitments were completed by the time Bulgaria and Croatia formally entered ERM II (“prior commitments”) and, in line with past practices, other commitments have to be completed after joining ERM II (“post-entry commitments”), with the aim of achieving a high degree of sustainable economic convergence by the time of euro adoption. Both prior and post-entry commitments needed to be reasonable, proportional and motivated. They also had to be specific, realistic and verifiable in nature. Finally, it was agreed that they had to be implemented, monitored and verified in a relatively short period of time.

In the meantime, adequate monitoring was established by the ECB and the European Commission within their respective remits in order to verify compliance with both prior and post-entry commitments. In particular, the ECB focused on commitments related to the banking sector, including both banking supervision and macroprudential issues. Following a mandate issued by the ERM II parties, the Commission focused on commitments concerning structural policies. In order to forestall overlap with other procedures, it was also noted that fiscal policies are governed by the Stability and Growth Pact, and that the judicial reforms and the fight against corruption and organised crime in Bulgaria were monitored by the Commission under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM).

Prior commitments were made by Bulgaria in the summer of 2018 and by Croatia in the summer of 2019, and completed by both countries before they joined ERM II on 10 July 2020. Three of these commitments were in the same policy areas for both Bulgaria and Croatia: (i) establishing close cooperation between ECB Banking Supervision and the national competent authorities (NCAs) under the legal framework of the SSM; (ii) strengthening the macroprudential toolkit by empowering NCAs to adopt so-called borrower-based measures, such as imposing limits on the debt service burden of borrowers relative to their income; and (iii) transposing EU anti-money laundering directives into national legislation. The other three commitments were country-specific and pertained to structural policies. Box 1 discusses these commitments in greater detail and describes the process of implementing and assessing the prior commitments falling under the ECB’s remit (i.e. those in the banking supervision and macroprudential fields), which were completed by the time the two countries joined ERM II. It also briefly explains how the supervision of non-euro area EU banks under close cooperation works in practice and how it differs from the supervision of euro area banks. Box 2 lists the structural policy-related prior commitments made by the Bulgarian and Croatian authorities, which fall under the remit of the Commission.

Post-entry commitments made by Bulgaria and Croatia on joining ERM II

• The Bulgarian authorities made commitments to implement additional measures on the non-banking financial sector, state-owned enterprises, the insolvency framework and the anti-money laundering framework. Furthermore, Bulgaria will continue implementing the extensive reforms under the CVM in the judiciary and in the fight against corruption and organised crime.
• The Croatian authorities made commitments to implement specific policy measures on the anti-money laundering framework, the business environment, state-owned enterprises and the insolvency framework.

At the time of its inclusion in ERM II, the central rate of the Bulgarian lev against the euro was set at the prevailing market rate, which was the same as the fixed exchange rate under the currency board arrangement (CBA). With the adoption of the standard fluctuation margins of ±15% it was also determined, in line with past arrangements, that the Bulgarian CBA is a unilateral commitment borne exclusively by Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank), which should place no obligation on the ECB or the other participants in ERM II.

The central rate of the Croatian kuna against the euro within ERM II was set at the prevailing market rate at the time of its inclusion. In line with past practice, the central rate was equal to the official ECB reference rate – published daily on the ECB’s website – of the Friday prior to the currency’s inclusion in ERM II. The inclusion of the Croatian kuna in ERM II is also subject to the standard fluctuation margins of ±15%.

Box 3 summarises the economic assessment supporting these exchange rate decisions.

Box 3
Assessing the central rates of the Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna within ERM II

Bulgaria and Croatia have both maintained nominal exchange rate stability for more than two decades (see Chart A). Bulgaria adopted a currency board arrangement in July 1997 to address hyperinflationary pressure. This was initially based on a legal obligation of Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank, BNB), enshrined in the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, to exchange domestic currency at the rate of 1,000 old Bulgarian levs per Deutsche Mark. Following a (purely nominal) redenomination of the Bulgarian lev in June 1999, the fixed exchange rate was realigned to 1 new Bulgarian lev per Deutsche Mark. When the Deutsche Mark lost its status as legal tender in Germany in 2002, the reference currency was changed to the euro and the fixed exchange rate set at 1.95583 levs per euro, equal to the irrevocable conversion rate between the Deutsche Mark and the euro. The Croatian kuna has been trading under a tightly managed floating exchange rate regime since its introduction in 1994, with no pre-announced level, path or band, and its exchange rate against the euro has been fluctuating within a narrow range of ±4.5% around its average level since 1999.

Chart A

Exchange rates of the Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna against the euro

(4 January 1999 to 14 October 2020; national currency units per euro)

In line with its currency board regime, BNB frequently exchanges Bulgarian levs for euro in operations with domestic banks, while Hrvatska narodna banka (HNB) only rarely intervenes in foreign exchange markets. As stipulated by the Law on BNB, the monetary liabilities of BNB are fully covered by its foreign reserves and BNB is obliged to exchange monetary liabilities and euro at the official exchange rate. Thus, the issuance of Bulgarian levs is not discretionary, but directly linked to the availability of international reserves. As a result, BNB does not need to undertake traditional foreign exchange interventions in order to maintain the exchange rate peg. Instead, it issues or absorbs national currency solely against reserve currency in transactions with the banking sector, referred to as “type II interventions”, such that the national currency supply automatically equates to the demand. In the case of the Croatian kuna, interventions have historically been carried out both to support and to weaken the currency, although more recently, until the coronavirus (COVID-19) shock, HNB has mostly intervened in order to counter appreciation pressures.

As a result of their credible commitments to maintaining exchange rate stability, both national central banks have accumulated comfortable buffers of foreign exchange reserves. Since the global financial crisis of 2007-08, BNB and HNB have significantly expanded their holdings of foreign exchange reserves. In 2019 the foreign exchange reserves of BNB and HNB stood at 47% of GDP and 38% of GDP respectively and substantially exceeded all traditional metrics of foreign exchange reserve adequacy.

Equally, both countries have experienced significant improvements in their external balances since the global financial crisis, turning their current account balances from double-digit deficits into surpluses. Their net international investment positions have also changed significantly – from around -100% of GDP for both countries to -50% for Croatia and -30% for Bulgaria, making the latter one of the least vulnerable central and eastern European countries.

This rebalancing was also paired with significant adjustment of relative costs and prices, such that from a normative perspective the Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna were assessed to be in line with fundamentals. The assessment of both countries’ external balances when they joined ERM II suggested that their current account balances were relatively close to their cyclically adjusted level, and if anything somewhat above their medium-term current account benchmarks, thus indicating that the currencies were not overvalued. At the same time, both countries’ relative price levels were close to what their relative income levels would suggest based on a comparative econometric analysis. In 2019 Bulgaria’s price level stood at 52% compared with the euro area, while its real per capita GDP was 49% of that of the euro area. Croatia’s price level was 65% compared with the euro area, while its real per capita GDP was 60% of that of the euro area.

In the absence of any significant real exchange rate misalignment, the ERM II parties decided to set the central rates of the Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna at the level of their prevailing market rates. In the case of the Bulgarian lev, this was equal to its fixed exchange rate under the currency board arrangement. Thus, the Bulgarian lev was included with its central rate set as its fixed exchange rate of 1.95583 levs per euro. The Croatian kuna was included with its central rate set to 7.53450 kuna per euro, corresponding to the level of the reference exchange rate (as published by the ECB based on a daily consultation between European central banks) ahead of its inclusion.

Both countries were included in ERM II with a standard fluctuation margin of ±15%. At the same time, it was accepted that Bulgaria would join with its existing currency board arrangement in place as a unilateral commitment imposing no additional obligations on the ECB.

5 Conclusion: the way ahead and related challenges

Joining ERM II is a necessary step towards euro adoption. At present, 19 EU Member States have adopted a common monetary policy with the euro as a common currency. Under the Treaty, all other EU Member States except Denmark are expected to introduce the euro once the necessary requirements have been fulfilled.

From a procedural angle, the decision on euro adoption is taken by the Council of the European Union in line with the relevant Treaty provisions, including the need to stay in ERM II for at least two years. The process is defined in Article 140 and Protocol 13 of the Treaty and can be summarised as follows. After consulting the European Parliament and following discussion in the European Council, the Council shall, at the proposal of the European Commission, decide which Member States with a derogation fulfil the necessary conditions to adopt the euro. This decision is taken on the basis of the Maastricht economic and legal criteria. The Convergence Reports on the fulfilment of these criteria are prepared by the European Commission and the ECB. The Council shall act – on the basis of the recommendation of a qualified majority of euro area EU Member States – at the latest six months after receiving the Commission’s proposal, which is based on the conclusions of the Convergence Reports. The next Convergence Reports are expected to be published in the course of 2022.

From a policy standpoint, the adoption of the euro is an opportunity, albeit not a guarantee, for Member States to reap substantial benefits. Most importantly, the adoption of a global currency as legal tender fosters monetary stability, which in turn manifests itself in a stable and low real interest rate environment. This benefit, however, may also expose a country to vulnerabilities if it considers monetary stability as a substitute for disciplined and sustainable economic policies.

Article 140 of the TFEU states unambiguously that a country should achieve “a high degree of sustainable convergence” with the euro area before introducing the euro. This means that the adoption of the euro should be sustainable over the long run. Factors such as resilient economic structures, financial stability, the quality of institutions and governance, and the progressive enhancement of EU architecture also play a very important role. The convergence process, therefore, is not automatic, and at country level should be seen rather as a by-product of relentless policy efforts before and after adoption of the euro, i.e. as a continuum. It is for these reasons that the ECB press releases of 10 July 2020 on the inclusion of the Bulgarian lev and Croatian kuna in ERM II also emphasised a “firm commitment” by the respective authorities “to pursue sound economic policies with the aim of preserving economic and financial stability, and achieving a high degree of sustainable economic convergence.”^[35]

The role of ERM II as a preparatory phase for euro adoption and the regime shift this entails raise policy challenges that need to be addressed. The prior commitments made by the Bulgarian and Croatian authorities in recent years have spurred the introduction of important measures that will mitigate risks under ERM II. The additional, structural policy measures announced when they joined ERM II are therefore to be welcomed. However, while crucial steps have been taken in both countries to address macroeconomic imbalances, there is still significant progress to be made with regard to the overall quality of institutions and governance. In this regard, taking a long-term view on policymaking will be decisive going forward, especially in the light of the new divergence risks caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) shock.

Finally, these policy efforts will also need to include measures aimed at preventing the euro changeover from being used by firms and price-setters as an excuse for unwarranted price hikes that may harm the trust of the population in the single currency. In this regard, the national authorities, in cooperation with the European Commission and the ECB, can benefit from past experiences with euro changeover in other countries, which have included measures such as public campaigns and the introduction of dual price display, as well as agreements with relevant associations. The ECB is fully committed, along with the Commission, to supporting the Bulgarian and the Croatian authorities in the promotion of campaigns to prevent the rounding up of prices.