Giulia Leila Travaglini
- 1 October 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3128Details
- Abstract
- This paper presents the first causal evidence on how banks adjust their voluntary capital buffers (the capital headroom above the required level) in response to changes in capital requirements. Using granular euro area data and exploiting the threshold-based assignment of Other Systemically Important Institution (O-SII) buffers within a regression discontinuity design, we study the liability side of banks’ balance sheets, complementing the asset-focused literature on lending and risk-taking. This allows us to assess whether capital regulation is effective in enhancing bank resilience, arguably its main objective. We find that banks offset about half of higher capital requirements by cutting their voluntary buffers rather than raising new equity. The offsetting effect is more pronounced among banks with weaker balance sheets, particularly those with higher levels of non-performing loans. These results indicate that regulation aimed at strengthening resilience may be only partially effective, as banks use existing voluntary buffers when subject to higher requirements.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation