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Franck Malherbet

12 July 2011
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1359
Details
Abstract
In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm's matching model of unemployment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to implement and systematically compare these solutions in search-matching economies. Our results are twofold. First from the theoretical and methodological viewpoint, we extend a somewhat flexible search-matching economy to alternative bargaining solutions. In particular, we prove that the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are easily implementable within search-matching economies. Second, our results show that even though the traditional results of bargaining theory apply in this context, they are generally qualitatively different from the standard results, and the differences are quantitatively weaker than expected. This is of particular relevance in comparison with the results established in the earlier literature.
JEL Code
C71 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Game Theory and Bargaining Theory→Cooperative Games
C78 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Game Theory and Bargaining Theory→Bargaining Theory, Matching Theory
J20 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demand and Supply of Labor→General
J60 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers→General

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